Post-Deepwater Horizon efforts to build safety culture in the offshore oil and gas industry do not go far enough, according to a report issued Wednesday by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine.
The industry needs an “independent organization dedicated to safety and environmental protection, with no advocacy role,” asserts the report, titled “Strengthening the Safety Culture of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry.”
The American Petroleum Institute created the Center for Offshore Safety immediately after the 2010 Macondo well blowout to develop and promote safety improvements. The center “could be made independent of API to serve this purpose, with membership in the center as a requirement for all organizations working in the offshore oil and gas industry,” the report said.
The breadth and diversity of the industry is one reason safety culture varies widely, found researchers from the academies’ Transportation Research Board, Marine Board and Board on Human-Systems Integration.
About 75 offshore operation companies, 17 drilling contractors and more than 1,000 contractors and subcontractors – ranging from organizations of thousands to self-employed specialists – support drilling and production in the Gulf of Mexico.
“Multiple relationships also exist among operators, contractors, and subcontractors on offshore rigs and platforms that can diffuse responsibility for safety and make consistent practices difficult to implement,” the report says. “Because of their differing safety perspectives and economic interests, offshore oil and gas companies do not all belong to a single industry association that speaks with one voice regarding safety.
“The fragmented nature of the industry, heterogeneity among companies, and diversity among employees make it a challenge to set consistent goals and implement them through industry-wide agreements.”
The industry is still evolving into a safety culture, researchers found.
“As with many industries, however, a blaming culture still exists in the offshore industry, as well as a lack of systems thinking that results in focusing on the immediate proximal causes of a safety failure (such as human error) rather than system causes, including culture,” the authors added.
Leading a list of detailed recommendations for industry and regulators, the report calls for the industry to basically get together and decide what is right for safety. “Historically, the industry has not offered its vision for the type of regulatory system it supports,” the report says. “The industry should begin with a vision statement and a strategy for safety leadership. This vision should include a description of the regulatory system that best enables the accomplishment of these objectives, encourages continuous improvement, and enhances safety culture.”
To that end, the industry should work in concert with federal regulators “to define the optimal mix of regulations and voluntary activities needed to foster a strong safety culture.”
