The tragic accident at the Big Bayou Canot railroad bridge
early on the foggy morning of Sept. 22, 1993, turned a harsh
spotlight on the inland towboat industry.
Barges being pushed by the towboat Mauvilla hit a bridge
near Mobile, Ala., minutes before Amtrak's Sunset Limited was
to cross. The resulting train derailment killed 47 and injured
another 103.
The National Transportation Safety Board's investigative
report on the accident made a raft of recommendations to
everyone from the Coast Guard and the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers to the American Waterways Operators.
AWO's experience with NTSB goes back to that accident. "The
worst accident our industry has ever had," said Jennifer
Carpenter, the trade group's senior vice president, government
affairs and policy analysis. It wasn't exactly a good situation
for getting acquainted.
But as a result, AWO began developing the Responsible
Carrier Program. Since then, "we've made an effort to get to
know them," she said, to make sure they understand the industry
during more normal times. "And they've been very willing over
the years to do that. By and large, we have found that their
recommendations make sense. They can move the Coast Guard, but
they can also influence us directly."
NTSB recommendations have had a significant impact on the
industry. Perhaps best known for probing airline accidents, the
independent NTSB is supposed to prevent or reduce the severity
of transportation accidents. It has no enforcement power, but
it has the power of persuasion.
The nearly 400-employee agency's Office of Marine Safety has
14 investigators. In major marine accidents, the NTSB becomes
the lead agency on the scene, which means it evaluates the
Coast Guard as well. Several years ago, the two agencies signed
a memorandum of understanding that aims to outline how each
will handle an investigation.
"We take the primary role," said marine investigator Morgan
Turrell. "NTSB determines who the parties will be."
Doug Rabe, chief of the Coast Guard's investigations
division, described the current relationship with the NTSB as
"excellent. We are cooperating well. We are getting things done
together. We talk to each other frequently. They seem to
understand how we get our business done. We understand their
mandate."
The Coast Guard doesn't always move as fast as the NTSB
might want, because the regulatory process takes time. On the
other hand, the NTSB has been faulted for taking too long to
complete investigations.
INVESTIGATION PROCESS
Once it decides to get involved, the NTSB immediately sends
a team of 10 to 15 people including five or six investigators,
one of the five members of the politically appointed governing
board, a lawyer and a public relations specialist.
The NTSB sets up a command post and examines everything from
voyage data recorders to operations to engineering to naval
architecture. They get log books, company procedure manuals and
phone records, and talk to witnesses.
The on-scene phase lasts about a week. The rest of the
investigation could take another six to eight months depending
on the circumstances. Pertinent data are sent to the NTSB in
Washington for analysis. If the agency does not have the needed
expertise, "We do contract out some work," Turrell said.
Once a staff report is complete, it goes to the five-member
board for adoption. In any legal dispute involving the
accident, only the factual report section, not the board
analysis, is admissible, Turrell said.
The Congressional Research Service has raised flags about
some aspects of NTSB's procedures. Two issues CRS cited in a
report last year are "concerns over industry stakeholders
lobbying NTSB officials in attempts to influence the scope or
language of NTSB investigative findings, and the NTSB's heavy
reliance on experts from transportation entities with a vested
interest in the outcome of an investigation for fact gathering
and data analysis."
In addition, the Government Accountability Office noted that
NTSB has a good track record on getting recommendations
implemented, but "investigations are often - sometimes
unnecessarily - lengthy." And reports can go through multiple
revisions, all of which may hamper the agency's goal of
improving transportation safety.
"They move slowly and methodically," said Henry S. Woods,
owner of Trident Marine Safety Associates , Houston, who does
work for insurance companies, lawyers and risk adjusters. "You
get kind of a committee-reviewed report out of NTSB."
If he were grading the agency, Woods said, he'd give it a
C-plus. "Sometimes I find that they left out some important
aspects. Completeness would be more of a concern than
accuracy," he said.
Woods and others said NTSB needs to put more emphasis on
human factors and how various elements of an accident are
related.
"We do not try to find liability," said Jack Spencer,
director of the NTSB's Office of Marine Safety. "Our job is to
investigate the accident and identify if there are safety
issues that need to be addressed. We never name names. We look
for weaknesses."
NTSB tries to identify significant issues and come up with
recommendations that can reasonably be implemented, he said,
"so we're not going to ask for the moon in general."
As for timing of reports, Spencer said the office is trying
to "shoot for a year and make them the absolute best quality we
can."
Some have taken a lot longer. For example, the NTSB has not
issued a final report on the May 2003 boiler room explosion
that killed seven crew members on the cruise ship Norway docked
at the Port of Miami.
WEIGHT STANDARDS
The NTSB has been pushing for changes to passenger vessel
weight standards, based on the fact that Americans are heavier
than when the guidelines were first set in 1942. The added
weight can affect stability and load factors. The industry
already was considering changes when the NTSB investigated two
fatal tour boat accidents. The agency said out-of-date weight
standards were partially responsible for the two capsizings.
Shortly after the first NTSB report was released last year, the
Coast Guard issued voluntary weight guidelines.
In an unusual move, the Coast Guard recently filed detailed
comments on the NTSB's findings in one of the two tour-boat
accidents - the 2004 capsizing of the Lady D in Baltimore
Harbor. NTSB cited stability and load problems and faulted the
Coast Guard's certification of the vessel and stability
standards.
The Coast Guard disputed the findings and contended that
given the weather in the area at the time, the boat should
never have gone out. (The Coast Guard has been sued in federal
court by the tour company's insurers alleging certification
errors.)
A former NTSB investigator created a buzz with his remarks
that the probe of the capsizing of the Ethan Allen on Lake
George, N.Y., in 2005 was flawed. He questioned, among other
things, the testing of a bilge pump and the selection of
evidence. Capt. Robert Ford, who is now in private industry,
said he left NTSB a little over a year ago because he wasn't
able to do the job he wanted to do. Ford was the lead
investigator in the NTSB's Ethan Allen probe.
He wants Congress to order the NTSB to reconsider the
investigation. "Our staff didn't see anything that indicates
there is a need to reopen the investigation," said Mary Kerr,
spokesman for the House Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee.
"We think we did a real thorough job, and we're satisfied
with the report," Spencer said.